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STATE OWNERSHIP IN THE  
SLOVENIAN ECONOMY:  
PROGRESS FROM CATASTROPHE?
Nicholas Ivers
Introduction
 In times of recession or slow growth, 
policy discourse tends to focus on short-term 
challenges, such as reducing unemployment, 
achieving fiscal stability, and promoting real 
growth. The Eurozone crisis (2009–present) 
and ensuing recession have undeniably afflict-
ed Slovenia’s economy, and much of the prob-
lem can be traced to a set of interrelated factors 
that are outside the direct control of Slovenian 
policy makers, including the international fi-
nancial crises, contraction of foreign markets, 
and the actions (or inactions) of the European 
Central Bank. However, Slovenia’s impressive 
pre-crisis growth rates and the undoubtedly 
international causes of its recent downturn 
should not serve to shield inefficient domestic 
policies from attention and correction. 
 Relative to other formerly socialist Cen-
tral and Eastern European countries, Slove-
nia has a large state presence in its economy, 
mostly in the form of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs). While there are scenarios under which 
state ownership may be the best option, these 
tend to involve cases in which market failure 
is unavoidable, such as natural monopolies. 
The Slovenian state-owned sector, on the other 
hand, is a relic of Slovenia’s political history, 
providing more cost than benefit. This article 
explores why that state sector persists in its 
present bloated form and what reforms, if any, 
are both economically effective and politically 
possible.
The Extent and Consequences of State 
Ownership
 Slovenia’s version of market capitalism is 
unique among the former socialist countries of 
Eastern Europe. While private enterprise now 
accounts for the majority of economic activ-
ity, a uniquely large portion of the Slovenian 
economy remains state controlled. In 2011, 
SOEs accounted for one-sixth of value added 
in the Slovenian economy. State ownership 
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is concentrated in sectors dominated by larg-
er corporations, notably finance, energy, and 
telecommunications. During the same year, 11 
percent of the Slovenian labor force was em-
ployed by SOEs (Georgieva and Riquelme, p. 2). 
Both economic theory and research suggest 
that such a pronounced state presence in pro-
duction can be expected to have adverse eco-
nomic consequences. SOEs are generally inef-
ficient relative to privately owned corporations 
for two related reasons. First, SOEs compro-
mise the incentives that motivate firms to pro-
duce as efficiently as possible. Second, in place 
of profit maximization, political incentives 
drive SOE decision making and these are at 
odds with economic efficiency in most realistic 
scenarios. In Slovenia, state ownership has had 
an obvious impact on the economic landscape. 
Patronage and corruption are common, and 
resistance to open privatization has resulted in 
a domestic banking sector dominated by inef-
ficiently small firms. Currently, a combination 
of foreign pressure to improve Slovenia’s fis-
cal balance and popular disillusionment with 
the old system may provide an opportunity 
for effective reform. In 2013, the government 
committed to privatizations of some important 
enterprises but left a large portion of the econ-
omy in state hands. A more extensive privatiza-
tion policy is desirable. 
A Brief History of Privatization in  
Slovenia (1991–2013)
 The early 1990s saw the end of the social-
ist era and the rebirth of capitalist institutions 
in Eastern Europe. Over the course of the next 
decade, the formerly socialist nations adopted 
and adjusted to market capitalism with vary-
ing degrees of success. Russia’s economy, for 
instance, collapsed. Its GDP fell by nearly 44 
percent between 1989 and 1999 and did not 
reach pre-transition levels until 2008.  Other 
nations, such as the Czech Republic and Po-
land, also experienced economic contraction 
during the beginning of the transition period 
but were able to recover and achieve strong 
growth by the middle of the 1990s. Situated on 
the western border of socialist Europe, Slove-
nia was never fully disengaged with Western 
Europe, economically or culturally, and the na-
tion’s extant institutions were better suited to 
the reintroduction of market capitalist econo-
my than most other formerly socialist nations. 
As a result, the transition period in Slovenia 
was among the easiest; GDP per capita levels 
reached pre-transition levels by the middle of 
1998 (Trading Economics). A period of rapid 
economic growth that lasted until the global fi-
nancial crisis of 2007–2008 followed. Neverthe-
less, the market capitalism that has emerged 
in Slovenia has not been without significant 
institutional flaws.
 The Transition Period
 In November 1992, the Slovenian gov-
ernment passed the Law on the Transforma-
tion of Social Ownership, and its provisions 
included elements of both decentralized pri-
vatization and mass privatization.1 The law 
allocated roughly 40 percent of shares in the 
nation’s larger enterprises to three state funds: 
the Pension Fund (Kapitalska Družba [KAD]), 
the Restitution Fund (Slovenska Odškod-
ninska Družba [SOD]), and the Development 
Fund, although the purpose of the Develop-
ment Fund was to prepare corporations for 
eventual privatization. Small enterprises, on 
the other hand, tended to be privatized inter-
nally. Managers and sometimes workers could 
acquire discounted shares of the enterprises 
for which they worked. Shares not allocated to 
the state funds or stakeholders were distribut-
ed through a voucher process, either through 
direct auction or by way of the Development 
Fund (Mencinger, p. 8).
 Although mass privatization was adver-
tised as a way to distribute equity broadly and 
fairly, the Slovenian market began to consol-
idate soon after the formal privatization of 
1993–1994. The state proved unwilling to di-
vest itself of shares that were originally ear-
marked for ultimate privatization. As a result, 
the three major state funds reduced only the 
breadth of their portfolios, not their size. This 
was partially due to the public’s expressed 
 1Decentralized “auction privatizations” occur when 
a state sells assets on an open market by an auction system. 
“Mass privatizations,” on the other hand, distribute shares 
to citizens “for free.” Auction privatizations tend to be 
more economically efficient, whereas mass privatizations 
are more politically attractive and, arguably, more equita-
ble. For a fuller explanation, see Mencinger.
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distaste for the selling of public shares to for-
eigners (Mencinger, pp. 12–13). 
 Private holding of corporate equity also 
became more concentrated. Internally privat-
ized firms were sold at discounts to managers 
and workers; therefore, some individuals were 
able to capitalize on informational advantages 
and political connections to acquire valuable 
property cheaply. On the other hand, many 
other citizens simply sold vouchers for cash, 
preferring a short-term consumption boost to 
saving. The flood of vouchers onto a fledgling 
market created a glut of equity at a time when 
that market was illiquid and volatile to begin 
with (Mencinger, p. 14). As a result, equity of-
ferings were not viable sources of capital for 
enterprises. Although the situation eventually 
stabilized, information asymmetry and insider 
trading have become enduring features of the 
Slovenian equity market, further reinforcing 
the high concentration of domestic equity 
(Mencinger, p. 27).
 The 2000s: Leveraged Insider  
 Privatization
 Despite the imperfections of the privat-
ization process of the 1990s, the beginning of 
the new millennium was a prosperous time for 
Slovenia. The economy grew quickly enough to 
warrant Slovenia’s accession to the European 
Union (2004), the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development  (OECD) (2007), 
and the Eurozone (2007). As the nation be-
came more integrated with Europe, there was 
pressure from abroad to make the Slovenian 
economy more similar to that of Western Eu-
rope; this entailed reducing the state’s role in 
the economy, particularly as an equity holder.
 However, attempts to bring the Slove-
nian economy more in line with the Western 
European model faced political opposition, 
and attempts to sell state-owned banks Nova 
Ljubljanska Banka (NLB) and Nova Kreditna 
Banka Maribor (NKBM) to foreign strategic 
investors failed in 2001 (Lindstrom and Piros-
ka, pp. 122–24).  Beginning in 2005, the state 
again began to privatize some state assets. 
However, this time the sales differed in a key 
respect from the proposed bank sales of 2001: 
they were insider privatizations, which meant 
 
that the terms of the sales were negotiated 
with firms’ managers, who became the new 
owners. On the premise of “national interest,” 
the transactions were strictly domestic; for-
eign investors were not given the opportunity 
to bid for shares. The beverage firm Pivovarna 
Laško, the trading company Mercur, construc-
tion firms SCT and Vegrad, and the financial 
holding company Istrabenz were among the 
most prominent firms to be privatized this way 
(Kracˇun).
 The management buy-outs of SOEs 
during this time were generally facilitated by 
leverage, and Slovenia’s large state-owned 
banks provided managers with the capital need-
ed to acquire controlling interests in their re-
spective firms. It now seems that these insider 
privatizations were compromised by political 
interests and had little economic justification. 
The OECD credits the relative severity of Slo-
venia’s banking crisis in part to credit misallo-
cation by state-owned banks. It suspects that 
the banks provided soft funding for buy-outs 
by politically connected managers, causing 
high default rates during and after the global 
financial crisis (OECD, pp. 8–9). Since the cri-
sis, the insider privatizations of the mid-2000s 
have been called into question, and several for-
mer executives have been tried and convicted 
of “executing illegal instruments,” although it 
is widely understood that their true crime was 
theft of public property (Kracˇun). 
 It is unclear to what extent Slovenia’s 
banking collapse can be attributed to the cor-
rupt insider privatizations. Given the inter-
national scope of the financial crisis, it seems 
likely that the soft lending that fueled the pri-
vatizations exacerbated the problem but was 
not its sole cause. In any case, the state and 
its banks, which were compliant in the transac-
tions and provided most of the leverage need-
ed, now face one of the highest default rates 
in Europe. In 2012, 15 percent of loans were 
non-performing, nationally. Among the large 
state-owned banks, the figure was 30 percent 
(OECD, p. 10). Beginning in 2013, in an effort 
to stabilize the banking system, ownership of 
non-performing assets was assumed by the “bad 
bank,” which was instituted expressly for the 
purpose of restoring solvency in the banking 
system (Majnardi, “Bad Bank Ready...”).2  
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SOEs, the Slovenian Economy, and  
Political Patronage
 State-Owned Enterprises 
 As explained previously, SOEs have 
played a major role in the Slovenian economy 
since the transition era. A company that is an 
SOE is wholly or partially owned by the state. 
There were at least 80 such firms in Slovenia as 
recently as 2011, accounting for approximate-
ly one-sixth of economic value added per year 
(Georgieva and Riquelme, p. 2). The govern-
ment does not have a controlling interest in all 
of them. The firms that are generally associated 
with the term “SOE” tend to be relatively large 
and state controlled, meaning that the state is 
a key shareholder, holding nearly 50 percent 
or more of their shares.  Notable examples in-
clude the country’s two largest banks, NLB and 
NKBM; communications firm Telekom Slo-
venije; and the greater part of Slovenia’s ener-
gy industry. Until 2008, Slovenia’s SOEs were 
financially stable, contributing dividends to the 
treasury each year (Kracˇun). 
 However, even well functioning state own-
ership is most often inferior to private owner-
ship when measured in terms of economic ef-
ficiency. A large volume of empirical work has 
been devoted to determining the performance 
of SOEs relative to privately owned corpora-
tions. In OECD countries, privatizations have 
generally produced economic improvements, 
leading to increased profitability, efficiency, 
and productivity (Megginson and Netter, p. 31). 
Perhaps surprisingly, the record is similar 
across a wide variety of institutional contexts; 
privatization and open equity markets are asso-
ciated with better firm performance in both the 
transitional/developing countries and in OECD 
countries (Boubakri et al.). In the two decades 
since its initial privatizations commenced, Slo-
venia has evolved, moving from the former cat-
egory to the latter category; yet the gains from 
privatization have not yet been fully realized.
 The Political Roots of Inefficiency
 In addition to providing empirical anal-
yses of SOE performance, economists have 
attempted to explain why state-owned firms 
underachieve in so many different industries 
and institutional contexts. During the transi-
tion era, economists Andrei Schleifer, Maxin 
Boycko, and Robert Vishny developed a frame-
work that provides useful general insights. The 
key idea is that politicians are not profit max-
imizers in the way that private shareholders 
are. Instead, their primary incentive is to win 
elections. Thus, when a state owns firms and 
politicians run them, resources are allocated 
in a way that maximizes politicians’ likelihood 
of accomplishing that goal (Schleifer et al., 
p. 311). The full potential of the market system 
is not realized.
 In their framework, Schleifer and col-
leagues suggest that politicians use their con-
trolling power to over-employ, meaning that 
they pay above-market wages or hire more 
workers than would a profit-maximizing firm. 
In doing so, politicians can create a dependent 
interest group. If the public is uninformed 
or unable to grasp the detrimental effects of 
over-employment and if patronage is an ef-
fective way to gain votes, then the politician 
loses little but gains much by this behavior. 
In essence, through SOEs politicians have the 
ability to provide a hidden wage subsidy to in-
terest groups that, if done explicitly and openly, 
would come with a greater political cost.
 Unfortunately, applying the theory of 
Schleifer and colleagues directly to Slovenian 
SOEs is difficult. Reality lacks the neat simplic-
ity of theory. The conceptually convenient idea 
of over-employment, for example, is too nar-
row. In Slovenia, patronage could conceivably 
flow through a variety of channels: contracts 
with other firms, allocation of lucrative mana-
gerial positions, employment of redundant em-
ployees, and allocation of savings on the basis 
of political connections rather than financial 
merit (in the case of state-owned banks), to 
name a few. Understanding how patronage is 
dispensed is critical if reform is to be effective.
 The Rent-Seeking State
 In Slovenia, the root of inefficiency in 
 2The bad bank’s primary function is to act as a de-
pository for bad loans in the Slovenian banking system. 
It is analogous to the Emergency Economic Stabilization 
Act of 2008 in the United States, which permitted the U.S. 
treasury to purchase toxic assets in an effort to provide li-
quidity for the financial system.
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the state-owned sector is political; this much 
is consistent with the Schleifer-Boycko-Vishny 
model. Control of Slovenian SOEs has been 
an economic and political asset to politicians 
since the 1990s. Corporate governance has 
been so entwined with national politics that 
one economist, Mitja Steinbacher, calls Slo-
venia “a rent-seeking state.”3 He explains that 
managerial control tended to change hands 
after changes in the distribution of power in 
Slovenian politics (Steinbacher). Steinbach-
er’s view is consistent with the views of other 
experts. As economist Jože Damijan explains, 
“The old elite came back to power (in 1992) 
and stayed there for an additional 12 years. Its 
main focus was on protecting the economic 
interests of the elite and to extract the rents 
from the companies controlled directly or indi-
rectly by the state” (Damijan). The system was 
stable until a newly elected government, led 
by Janez Janša and representing those scorned 
by the old elite, came to power in 2004. De-
spite seeing itself as representing the victims 
of the old elite, the new government did little 
to nothing to mitigate rent seeking. Rather, as 
Damijan states, “Their goal was not to change 
the institutional system, to improve the incen-
tives, to lift the regulation or to privatize the 
companies to foreigners” (Damijan). Instead, 
they appointed supporters to supervisory and 
management boards to cement their control 
of SOEs. In turn, control of SOEs enabled the 
new government to continue the established 
practice of granting supply contracts to insiders.
 Furthermore, according to Damijan, the 
insider privatizations of the mid-2000s repre-
sent another episode of rent seeking. The as-
cendance of the Janša government coincided 
with Slovenia’s accession to the EU, and inter-
national pressure to restructure the Slovenian 
government provided a convenient pretext 
for insider privatization. Managers connected 
to the Janša government were able to secure 
cheap loans for management buy-outs (Dami-
jan). The state, by way of the banks that it 
owned and controlled, assumed an inordinate 
amount of risk in the name of domestic pri-
vatization. This process effectively transferred 
wealth from the public to recipient managers 
of soft funding.
 The Role of Ideology and  
 Economic Nationalism
 Ironically, one of the main reasons that 
state ownership and rent seeking have gone 
uncorrected by the democratic process is that 
the Slovenian public, which has the most to 
gain from effective reform, is resistant to the 
open auction privatizations that represent the 
best option. Perhaps because of being subject 
to culturally distinct foreign powers for much 
of its history, Slovenians are generally averse 
to anything that may lead to undue intrusion 
by outsiders in their domestic affairs. This 
attitude extends to the economy—econom-
ic nationalism, or the idea of “national inter-
est,” persists in Slovenia. The main feature of 
this doctrine is a resistance to the takeover of 
domestic firms by foreigners; it is feared that 
foreign ownership would lead to a loss of eco-
nomic and political sovereignty.
 The national interest concept has influ-
enced economic policy on several occasions.  It 
was invoked during the 1990s, when the first 
wave of privatization began, and again during 
the 2000s, when Slovenia became more in-
tegrated into the EU. Economist and former 
Minister for Economic Relations Davorin 
Kracˇun views the policy of national interest 
as a manipulation of the public’s patriotism. 
The primary alternatives to foreign ownership 
were continued state ownership and domestic 
insider privatization, both of which tended to 
favor whoever held political power at a given 
moment in time (Kracˇun).  
 Perhaps the best illustration of the nation-
al interest doctrine came during the attempted 
privatizations of Slovenia’s two largest state-
owned banks. In 2001 the government formed 
a plan to privatize the majority of shares of the 
nation’s two largest banks, NLB and NKBM. 
Sixty-four percent of each bank was to be sold 
to foreign strategic investors. The proposal was 
met with public backlash and political opposi-
tion. The Maribor region, in particular, resist-
ed the sale of “its” bank, NKBM. By 2002, only 
a minority stake in NLB had been sold to the 
Belgian bank KBC (Lindstrom and Piroska, 
pp. 122–24). In the end, the state retained a 
 3“Rent seeking” is the use of political or economic 
influence to increase one’s own wealth without creating 
additional wealth.
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controlling interest in both banks.
 The Slovenian Banking Sector 
 The banking sector also provides an il-
lustration of how state ownership can affect 
market outcomes. Together, NLB and NKBM, 
Slovenia’s two largest banks, control approxi-
mately 35 percent of the banking market. In 
the third and fourth positions are two more 
state-owned banks, SID Bank and Abanka Vipa, 
each holding a market share of approximate-
ly 9 percent (“Market Shares of Biggest Banks 
in Decline”). Figure 1 shows that, by Europe-
an standards, both NLB and NKBM are quite 
small. Most other European banking markets 
are dominated by much larger multi-nationals. 
The chart compares the asset values of Slove-
nia’s largest banks (NLB and NKBM) to those 
of several major Europe-based multi-national 
banks.
 Recent empirical work by Mark Dijkstra 
suggests that the extent of consolidation in 
European banking has valid economic foun-
dations. Bank size roughly matches models of 
scale economies, although this may be partly 
explained by an implicit “too-big-to-fail” sub-
sidy (Dijkstra). Another study, using a data 
set of American banks, finds that when risk is 
modeled within the profit function, large banks 
face economies of scale at their current sizes 
even when too-big-to-fail effects are ignored, 
suggesting that economies of scale have tra-
ditionally been underestimated in banking 
(Hughes and Mester).  Regardless of the exact 
extent of scale economies, it is reasonable to 
conclude that Slovenia’s “large” state-owned 
banks, which are one to two orders of magni-
tude smaller than the major European multi- 
nationals, fall well short of efficient scale.
 In a well-functioning capital market, 
small-scale inefficiencies are corrected by 
mergers, acquisitions, or some other means 
of consolidation. In Slovenia, this would like-
ly entail the purchase of NLB and NKBM by 
foreign-based multi-nationals. Indeed, the Bel-
gian bank KBC’s successful bid for NLB in 2001 
was derailed by a political backlash. In effect, 
economic nationalism, combined with politi-
cal incentives, has allowed state ownership to 
continue where strategic foreign investment 
would produce a more efficient economic out-
come. 
 Unfortunately, this is indicative of the 
state presence in the Slovenian corporate sec-
tor in general. Political factions are incentiv-
ized to keep the status quo, because it allows 
them to seek rents when they are in power. At 
the same time, the democratic process does 
not correct the problem, because the public 
opposes the open auction privatizations that 
would offer the easiest solution. Economist 
Figure 1 
Total Assets in Billions of Euros (2012)—Select European Banks
Note: Y-axis is logarithmic. 
Sources: NLB Group, Nova KBM, Erste Group, Societe Generale, KBC Bank, and BNP Paribas.
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Jože Damijan suggests that this deleterious 
balance may only be broken by foreign pressure 
(Damijan).
   
Recent Reform Legislation
 2011–2012
 In 2011, the OECD issued a report en-
dorsing Slovenia’s then recently drafted “Ac-
tion Plan for Corporate Governance Reform,” 
which included the Corporate Governance of 
State Investments Act. According to the re-
port, “Slovenia has taken significant steps to 
improve the governance of its SOEs” (OECD, 
p. 2). The crucial legislative component of the 
law was the establishment of a central owner-
ship agency, AUKN (translated loosely as the 
Asset Management Fund of Slovenia). This 
agency was established to take direct control of 
the government’s shareholding role, previously 
dispersed among many independent, disparate, 
and nontransparent ministries. The OECD 
and Slovenian lawmakers anticipated that cor-
porate governance of Slovenia’s SOEs would 
become more transparent as a result. Greater 
transparency would, in turn, reduce the role of 
politics in corporate decision making. 
 The plan failed. Following a shift in po-
litical power in 2012, AUKN became embroiled 
in controversy. In November the head of the 
agency, Janez Bencˇina, stepped down, citing 
“personal reasons.” However, the Slovenian 
newspaper Delo speculated at the time that 
the resignation was in fact a result of political 
pressure (Majnardi, “Total Mess in State-owned 
Capital Asset Management”). Economist 
Davorin Kracˇun thinks similarly; the agency, 
which was established and staffed during the 
previous government, simply did not play into 
the hands of the ascending coalition. Instead of 
working with the agency, the new government 
dissolved it in 2013 (Kracˇun).
 2013–Present
 Having accumulated a large fiscal deficit, 
the Slovenian government continues to face 
pressure from abroad to improve its public fi-
nances, even as the nation’s economy teeters 
between stagnation and recession. The sale of 
assets in select SOEs is one potential way to al-
leviate the fiscal situation. In fact, during the 
early months of 2013, the government resolved 
to carry out a limited privatization of state as-
sets. Several important SOEs, including Tele-
kom Slovenija, NKBM, NLB, and Adria Airways, 
are expected to be sold to foreign investors, 
although the time frame remains uncertain. 
Government officials have promised to carry 
out the privatization in a transparent manner, 
perhaps reflecting the public’s resentment over 
the insider privatizations of the 2000s (Majnar-
di, “15 State Companies Listed for Privatiza-
tion”). The state will relinquish its controlling 
interest in those firms deemed “portfolio in-
vestments.” The state will retain 5 percent and 
25 percent stakes in “strategic” and “import-
ant” enterprises, respectively, which means 
that the plan is far from a full liberalization of 
the economy (Majnardi, “Government to Sell 
off State-owned Companies”). The majority of 
the current state-owned sector will remain at 
least partially state controlled (Rousek). As of 
January 2014, the financial firm Lazard Freres 
has been officially hired as a consultant in the 
sale of NKBM, so it appears that the privatiza-
tion plan is in motion (Majnardi, “Lazard Freres 
Adviser in Privatisation of NKBM Bank”). 
 As the current privatizations continue to 
develop, policy makers are once again attempt-
ing to consolidate the state’s shareholding 
power under a single agency. In place of the de-
funct AUKN, this time the central agency will 
be Slovenian Sovereign Holding (SSH). The 
exact framework is delineated in a Sovereign 
Holding Bill. As of December 2013, the bill pro-
poses to merge the Pension Fund (KAD) with 
the Restitution Fund (SOD), resulting in the 
creation of a new extended state holding agen-
cy (Majnardi, “Sovereign Holding Bill Adopted 
Despite Opposition of Pensioners”). In the pre-
liminary meetings held in January 2013, top 
parliamentary officials and proponents of the 
plan emphasized the need for independence. 
Top positions are to be reserved for technocrats 
with limited affiliations to political parties. Of 
course, this resolution echoes the goals, artic-
ulated just over two years ago, of the failed Cor-
porate Governance of State Investments Act.
Policy Assessment
 The Slovenian government is pursuing 
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two market reform strategies: privatization of 
select SOEs and consolidation of the state’s 
role as a key shareholder in national enterpris-
es. The current strategies represent a marginal 
improvement for the Slovenian economy in the 
long run, but they are motivated more by fiscal 
necessity and leave much to be desired.
 The privatizations will be open to foreign 
investors, and some sales will see the elimina-
tion of the state’s controlling interest. This is 
an improvement over previous privatizations, 
which either sold only minority stakes to for-
eign investors or excluded them completely 
in favor of domestic buyers. Of particular im-
portance are the sales of the two largest state-
owned banks, which will modernize Slovenia’s 
notoriously inefficient financial system. How-
ever, the state will retain large stakes in the 
majority of SOEs; the era of direct state influ-
ence in resource allocation is far from over. 
 The second reform, the creation of SSH, 
aims to improve the corporate governance of 
the firms that are to remain state owned. It 
is hoped that the centralized agency, by ap-
pointing experts rather than politicians to ex-
ecute the state’s function as shareholder, will 
bring a new level of transparency, efficacy, and 
competency to the boards of Slovenian SOEs. 
While admirable in principle, SSH is similar to 
AUKN, which did not survive the previous po-
litical cycle. 
 Even if the agency is able to survive its in-
fancy, it is questionable whether it can uphold 
the standard of virtuous technocracy that it is 
supposed to. In all likelihood, appointments 
will still be decided by elected officials, so the 
established channel of rent seeking will not be 
broken. Leaving decisions to true experts could 
well increase the competency of SOE boards, 
but what constitutes expertise is subject to a 
broad range of interpretation. Moreover, exper-
tise and corruption are not mutually exclusive. 
Everyone reacts to the right incentives.
 It may be argued that SSH, by providing 
a higher degree of transparency than the pre-
vious system, will allow the democratic process 
to more effectively identify rent seeking and 
elect officials that take steps to eliminate cor-
ruption. This is doubtful for two reasons. First, 
rents can be allocated subtly. If an SOE reaches 
a supply contract with another firm, how is the 
public to determine whether the decision was 
made competitively or for political gain? The 
cost of monitoring such low-level decisions 
would be prohibitively high. Second, there is 
no convenient yardstick to measure efficiency 
relative to a hypothetical private ownership 
scenario. In the private sector, competitive 
capital markets allow the economy to have its 
own built-in check on corporate performance. 
If a company is poorly run, it is vulnerable to 
takeovers that transfer decision-making power 
to those who can make better use of a firm’s 
capital. The market provides no such test for 
SOEs, because the government will have an 
inclination to hold onto its controlling inter-
est even if potential bids for shares exceed the 
present financial value of those shares. Share 
prices are also useless, because movements re-
act to expectations; and, if a firm is state owned 
over multiple time periods, there is no easy way 
to assess the effect of state ownership on per-
formance. Economists are able to use sophisti-
cated econometric techniques to do so, but it is 
questionable whether the public would be will-
ing or able to factor such research into voting 
decisions. 
Conclusion
 With channels of rent seeking intact, no 
reliable monitoring system, and no useful met-
ric of performance, it is unlikely that consoli-
dating the state’s shareholding responsibilities 
under SSH will solve the fundamental problem 
with SOEs: inefficiency due to weak incentives 
and the presence of opportunities for rent seek-
ing. From an economic standpoint, Slovenia 
would be better off privatizing the majority of 
its state-owned assets, rather than just a small 
fraction. Although such a solution would have 
been politically impossible just a few years ago, 
it is conceivable that the fiscal situation, which 
makes some key privatizations necessary in the 
near term, combined with continued pressure 
from abroad may create the conditions neces-
sary to move further toward this end. Econ-
omist Davorin Kracˇun believes that recent 
events, in particular the fallout from the insid-
er privatizations of the 2000s, have increased 
the level of disillusionment with the old system 
(Kracˇun). Whether popular frustration can be 
channeled in the proper direction remains to 
be seen. 
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